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MISSION NEIGHBORHOOD HEALTH CENTER: A CASE STUDY OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH EDUCATION AND WELFARE
AS A COUNTERINSURGENCY AGENCY
Thomas S. Bodenheimer, M.D., M.P.H.
Institute for the Study of Labor and Economic Crisis*
In the 1960's, working class communities all over
the country, particularly minority inner city neighbor-
hoods, exploded in violent anger. The federal government
responded with a pacification or cooling-out program: the
War on Poverty. The War on Poverty provided federal funds
to bring a few programs into the community, to create a
few jobs, and to buy off working class leaders who were
a threat to those in power. In the course of this pro-
gram of counterinsurgency, the War on Poverty took over
a slogan of the 1960's, "community control," and turned
it into its opposite; rather than control by the commu-
nity, "community control" came to mean control over the
working class majority of the community.
One of the War on Poverty's important programs was
the neighborhood health center program to provide ambu-
latory health care to low income people. This program,
initially slated to reach 25 million people through
1,000 health centers, was scaled down to 125 centers
serving only 1.5 million people. The standard view of
the neighborhood health center program holds that its
* The Institute for the Study of Labor and Economic Crisis
was requested by Mission Neighborhood Health Center pa-
tients to assist in their fight for democratic elections
and decent health care. This paper reflects the Institute's
understanding gained through active participation in
this struggle. The analysis put forth in the paper was
developed by Marlene Dixon, Ph.D., Research Director at
the Institute. Any shortcomings in the paper are entire-
ly the responsibility of the author.
This paper was first presented at the Society for the
Study of Social Problems, August 1979. Please direct all
communications to the author, Institute for the Study of
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aims were 1) to bring high quality health care to people
previously denied such care, 2) to provide employment
opportunities and training to neighborhood residents,
and 3) to allow community members to participate in the
governance of the health centers (Davis and Schoen,
1978). A more realistic view sees the neighborhood health
center program as a means to control, rather than to
assist, minority working class populations. This paper
takes the example of one neighborhood health center,
Mission Neighborhood Health Center in San Francisco,
to show how federal counterinsurgency works in the 1970's
and to expose the class character of "community control."
The Exploitation of Patients at
Mission Neighborhood Health Center
Mission Neighborhood Health Center (MNHC) was opened
in the late 1960's by the Office of Economic Opportunity,
the War on Poverty's central agency, to provide health
services to San Francisco's Mission District. More recent-
ly, MNHC has been funded by the federal Department of
Health Education and Welfare (HEW), which took over many
of the War on Poverty programs. MNHC is the only fully bi-
lingual health service available to the tens of thousands
of non-English speaking Latino people of San Francisco.
During its first years, MNHC was run by a medical
entrepreneur who used MNHC funds to help develop his own
private medical office building nearby (Hartman and
Feshbach, 1974). In 1975, a months-long community struggle
forced HEW to give the MNHC grant to the Mission Area
Health Associates (MAHA), a new community group with a
board of trustees whose majority was supposed to be elec-
ted by the health center's own patients. MAHA's victory
was considered to be a triumph for community control at
MNHC.
In 1977, a small clique of Latino youths gained con-
trol over the MAHA board of trustees. This clique ran a
network of Mission District poverty agencies, mainly con-
cerned with youth programs, including the Real Alternatives
Program, Centro de Cambio and Mission Community Legal De-
fense. At MNHC they named another member of their clique
to the $25,000 a year job as health center administrator,
though their friend had no experience administering a
health care institution.
By 1979 the health center was in shambles and its
patients were up in arms. Patients were forced to wait
in long lines to pay fees before being cared for. For
several months, patients who had outstanding bills
were not allowed to receive medical services until
they settled their bills. Many patients were recei-
ving incorrect bills for services they had never
gotten or had already paid for. A number of competent
health professionals and employees were terminated,
sometimes leaving patients without their health care
provider from one day to the next. The board had pur-
chased an extremely expensive and poorly programmed
computer that caused patients to wait an average of
1 3/4 hours to register at the health center. Trans-
portation services for elderly patients were reduced
while money was wasted on excess administrative sala-
ries. The health center's financial deficit topped
$200,000.
Worst of all, the clique running the board re-
fused to hold the yearly elections required by their
own by-laws. As the San Francisco Examiner's columnist
Guy Wright (1979a) p-t--it,
Board members whose terms expired more than
a year ago still cling to their seats, adop-
ting budgets, handing out raises, firing
anyone who objects -- and appointing friends
to fill vacancies when anyone resigns from
the board.
HEN, which has the responsibility of administering
the MNHC grant, knew of and ignored or encouraged the
mismanagement at the health center. HEW allowed the
health center's administrative costs to increase from
21% to 28% of the budget (U.S. Department of HEW,
1979a), though HEW suggests that such costs not exceed
20%. HEW approved the purchase of the computer that
was later investigated by the FBI for possible fraudu-
*Documentation for the facts presented in this paragraph
come from numerous MNHC memos and from the author's own
experience of being employed at MNHC for 3 years before
his firing in June 1979.
lent bidding practices and kickbacks (U.S. Department
of HEW, 1979b). HEW allowed the clinic's board members
to continue in office beyond their legal terms of of-
fice without demanding immediate elections, and HEW
repeatedly backed this board as the health center's
legitimate governing body.
The Health Center's Patients Fight Back
In 1979, as a result of community pressure, new
elections finally began. But in May, the clique con-
trolling the board disqualified a number of the candi-
dates in the election. Board members and their suppor-
ters physically and verbally intimidated volunteers
attempting to help get the election underway. A fight
took place at the clinic between board members and vol-
unteers, and the election never took place.
Thereupon, 70 patients of the health center sued
the board and won a June 8 agreement that the elections
must start immediately, under the supervision of a neu-
tral third party. Still, no action was taken to hold
the elections. With the help of the Rebel Worker Organ-
ization and the Grass Roots Alliance, worker and commu-
nity organizations who had been asked to get involved,
over 100 patients formed themselves into the Patients
Defense Association. They arrived en masse at the June
20 MAHA board meeting to demand decisive patient repre-
sentation in the running of the clinic. They were denied.
The Association, many of whose members were already
refusing to use clinic services, voted to formally boy-
cott the clinic. For four weeks, the patients picketed
the clinic, marching, educating and persuading. Hun-
dreds of patients honored the boycott, going without
health care or using alternative health services set up
by the Rebel Worker Organization. Patients sent hundreds
of letters and petition signatures to their elected re-
presentatives in Washington. By the end of the boycott,
the Patients Defense Association had grown to 800 members.
During the boycott, physical intimidation showed
itself again. One Patients Defense Association activist
had sugar poured into the gas tank of her car; another
had her car windshield broken; and yet another had ob-
jects thrown at the windows of her home. Gangs of youths
threateningly drove around the picket line, which was
largely made up of women and children.
Finally, the Regional Health Administrator of
HEW, Dr. Sheridan Weinstein, met with the Patients
Defense Association and agreed to guarantee a fair
election procedure. But at the same time that Dr.
Weinstein was negotiating with the Association, his
office was encouraging and financing a lawsuit against
the very organizations (the Grass Roots Alliance,
Rebel Worker Organization, and the Institute for the
Study of Labor and Economic Crisis) who were assisting
the patients in their struggle for democratic elections
and decent health care. This lawsuit, brought by the
clique controlling the MAHA board, asked for $1 million
in damages for libel and conspiracy.
HEW's promise to guarantee fair elections had
little substance. The Patients Defense Association's
lawyers were forced to go into court time and time
again, and only after obtaining ten court orders did
the elections finally take place. The MAHA board and
its lawyers, using HEW funds to finance one after
another courtroom maneuver, delayed the elections in
every way possible, including resisting a judge's
order. HEW was clearly supporting the MAHA board and
thereby keeping the organized working class patients
from participating in the election. Only another mas-
sive letter writing appeal to government officials,
combined with victory after victory in court, brought
about the elections. On October 9, after an intense 5
month struggle, the elections were concluded. All Pa-
tients Defense Association candidates won seats on the
new MAHA board by overwhelming majorities.
HEW again moved to block organized working class
power over the clinic. After reducing the clinic's
budget, HEW laid down strict conditions to the new
board requiring immediate crippling layoffs of clinic
employees and cutbacks in services. Failure to meet
these conditions would result in the replacement of
the new Hul-IA board by another community agency. The
new board, with its patient majority, is faced with
running a clinic left in financial shambles by the old
board and beseiged by HEW cutbacks and threats to take
the grant away. As columnist Guy Wright (1979b) put it,
HEW, which gave the old board extra money
because it was doing such a poor job, has
cut back on funding for the new board,
which must clean up the mess.
Analysis: HEW as Counterinsurgency
Historically, the federal government has spent
money for welfare and social service programs only at
times of mass insurgency by the working class (Piven
and Cloward, 1971). In the 1930's the government enac-
ted social security, unemployment and welfare programs
in response to the demonstrations and protests of mil-
lions of people, many organized by the growing Communist
Party. The 1950's, with little organized working class
unrest, produced almost no new social programs. But the
1960's, with its civil rights movement and urban rebel-
lions, brought a massive increase in welfare expendi-
tures, new health programs including Medicare, Medicaid
and neighborhood health centers, educational programs
such as Headstart, and "community action" and legal ser-
vices programs to put some pressure on local and state
governments. In fact, many of the War on Poverty programs
were targeted into areas of actual or potential urban re-
bellion.
These federal moneys, then, served as a massive do-
mestic counterinsurgency effort, designed to stop any
effective working class protest that could take root
and threaten the stability of the existing capitalist
order. Domestic counterinsurgency works by 1) channeling
money to programs which minimally alleviate the worst
horrors of life in minority working class communities
but which principally provide charity and create depen-
dency on government funds; and 2) funneling the money
through agencies that hire working class leaders and
buy them off with $20,000 a year positions and with
control over other jobs in the community. Those who
would not be bought off in this manner were frequently
assassinated or imprisoned, for example, leaders of the
Black Panthers. Those who were coopted became known to
many as poverty pimps, and formed a new stratum of so-
ciety, a stratum created by the needs of the state to
control the working class in minority neighborhoods
(Rebel Worker Newsjournal, 1979). The poverty pimps be-
came the managers of the counterinsurgency programs,
and as such gained control over aspects of the lives of
the working class majority in their communities. Their
control was termed "community control" because the po-
verty pimps came from the community. In this sense,
"community control" has come to mean control over the
working class community. The clique that ran the MAHA
board from 1977 to 1979 is a clear example of this
stratum of poverty pimps.
The Poverty Pimps: a Lumpen Petty Bourgeoisie
Using the terminology of Marxist class analysis,
the poverty pimps are a new stratum of the lower rungs
of the bourgeois class. Our society is made up of two
antagonistic classes, the bourgeoisie (capitalist
class) and the proletariat (working class) (Dixon, 1979).
The capitalist class owns and controls the vast majority
of the wealth -- the land, the factories, the oil and
natural resources. The working class is forced to work
for the capitalist class in order to survive, and those
unable to work become dependent upon and controlled by
government programs such as social security, unemploy-
ment compensation, disability and such services as those
offered by neighborhood health centers.
The lower strata of the bourgeois class are the
petty (small) bourgeoisie, most of whom today are em-
ployed by capital or by the state as managers and pro-
fessionals. Their function is to carry out the orders
of the capitalists in controlling and commanding the
day-to-day activities of the working class (Braverman,
1974). In the factory, this function is performed by
the planners, managers and foremen; in the welfare sys-
tem it is performed by the social workers. The petty
bourgeoisie does not in itself possess control over the
country's resources but, in return for financial rewards,
it serves as a transmission belt of control between the
bourgeoisie and the working class.
The stratum of the petty bourgeoisie that we call
the poverty pimps is a new stratum, created by the
counterinsurgency programs of the federal government.
Their purpose is to manage these programs for the benefit
of the government and thereby to pacify and control the
working class on behalf of the bourgeoisie. Many poverty
pimps may have taken their poverty agency positions with
the best of intentions. But any desires to serve the
community are snuffed out by the reality that they func-
tion as part of a state apparatus designed to rule and
control their communities (Rebel Worker Newsjournal,
1979). The poverty pimps have a stake in maintaining
the status quo in order to keep their own jobs. They
may engage in petty (or big) rip-offs of public funds,
and they create well-paying jobs for their friends
and themselves to preserve and expand their positions
and control. They come to identify with the government
funding agency against their own people.
When the poverty funds begin to shrink, the po-
verty pimps may resort to any means -- including using
their own gangs -- to keep their jobs and their con-
trol and to prevent themselves from being forced back
into the working class whence they came. This stratum
of poverty pimps is actually a lumpen petty bourgeoisie*,
a stratum of parasites created by the War on Poverty,
supported by taxpayers' money.
To conceal their true purpose from the working
class that they exploit, those poverty pimps who are
from minority communities may use the ideology of na-
tionalism; for example,
How can you criticize me, I'm Raza. We are
united by the racism we experience, so you
should support me. It doesn't matter that
I make $30,000 a year while you and your
family are on welfare. We are the same be-
cause my name is Gomez too (Martinez,
1979).
This kind of nationalism is a trick against the wor-
king class. It takes people's hatred of racism and
twists it into a weapon against them (Martinez, 1979).
And many white liberal and progressive people glorify
the poverty pimps, calling them "The Community," when
actually they are a tiny portion of the community that
exploits the working class majority.
Domestic counterinsurgency and its creation of a
lumpen petty bourgeoisie is in essence no different
*According to Marx, the lumpen proletariat are the petty
criminals, pimps, small drug pushers -- the poor who
steal from the poor and exploit the poor, whose role
in history is as a "bribed tool of reactionary intrigue.'
than the international counterinsurgency which moti-
vated such programs as the Alliance for Progress in
the 1960's. The Alliance for Progress infused money
into Latin Americi to pacify growing anti-American
social movements. It also created and strengthened
a stratum of compradors (people who sold out the in-
terests of their country for personal gain) similar
to the poverty pimps, to administer the Alliance for
Progress money and to control the population (for
descriptions of world class formation, see Dixon,
1978; Jonas and Dixon, 1979). In its arsenal of coun-
terinsurgency techniques, the Alliance for Progress
utilized both the carrot and the stick: the food, agri-
cultural and housing programs; and the repressive mi-
litary and police apparatus.
HEW domestic counterinsurgency also utilizes
both the carrot and the stick. The carrot is the
charity of giving money to tranquilize the people
and buy off their leaders; to make people depend on
welfare checks, food stamps and neighborhood health
centers; and thereby to prevent their organizing to
really change their situation in society. The stick
is to take away these charities if people cause trou-
ble, a stick which is used to control both the pover-
ty pimps and the working class. "Step out of line and
you'll lose your little empire," the Feds tell the
pimps. "Step out of line and you'll lose your food
stamps, your clinics or your Headstart programs," the
pimps tell the people (Rebel Worker Newsjournal, 1979).
Counterinsurgency at
Mission Neighborhood Health Center
At MNHC, HEW counterinsurgency has shown itself
as unwavering support for the poverty pimps, the small
clique that controlled the MAHA board, against the
*The Alliance for Progress also served to create demand
for U.S. products, which is an example of state capital-
ism -- taxpayers' money funneled into corporate profits.
HEW funding of health programs is also state capitalist
as well as counterinsurgent, but that is not the subject
of this paper.
organized working class patients. HEW knew for months
that the board was violating its own by-laws by not
holding elections, yet HEW continued to back them.
In particular, when the Patients Defense Association,
Rebel Worker Organization and Grass Roots Alliance
began to work together to demand fair elections, HEW
financed and encouraged the board's legal maneuvers
to sabotage the elections and to sue the patients'
supporters (Puga v.Hernandez, 1979). HEW attempted to
discourage the patients and make them give up, and
on several occasions blamed the patients for causing
the problems at the clinic, problems for which HEW
was actually responsible. And in encouraging the law-
suit against the patients' supporters, HEW was attemp-
ting to silence its own critics, showing no regard
for freedom of speech and the right of responsible
criticism.
The clique running the MAHA board acted in
classic lumpen petty bourgeois fashion, with its
financial exploitation of the working class -- making
the patients pay increased clinic fees (often in
cash) to support the high administrative salaries
voted by the board for their friends. The clique did
everything in its power to keep the working class
from taking away its control over the clinic. And
the clique attempted to disorganize the patients by
warning that further protest would cause HEW to close
down the clinic ("Step out of line and you'll lose
your clinic.")
Now that the clique has been removed and a new
patient-dominated board has been elected, HEW is pul-
ling out an old favorite in its bag of counterinsur-
gency tricks: if you don't do what we say, we'll give
the grant to someone else ("Step out of line and
you'll lose your little empire.") In its October 3,
1979 grant award, HEW places 20 conditions on the new
board, in particular the requirement for immediate
substantial cutbacks in services. If the new board
fails to meet these anti-patient conditions, HEW will
look for another organization to run the clinic (U.S.
Department of HEW, 1979c). In that way, HEW is trying
to repeat the cycle: trying to turn a new group of wor-
king class people into a new clique of poverty pimps,
who take the side of HEW rather than of the patients
whom they were elected to represent. Using the carrot
(control over jobs and money) and the stick (do what
we want or we'll give the grant to someone else), HEW
will forever attempt to coopt and control the struggles
of working class people for a voice in the decisions
that affect their lives.
The Fight for True Patient Representation
The struggle for elections at MNHC was not a
struggle to replace one set of poverty pimps with
another. It was about democracy, about a voice for
the majority of working class people in our country
who have always been disenfranchised and ignored. The
patients who won the recent MNHC election didn't seek
to be on the board as unaccountable individuals. They
were chosen as representatives of the 800-member Pa-
tients Defense Association, and they pledged to repre-
sent the interests of the Association, of the patients
of the health center, and not just of themselves.
In a statement made during the MNHC boycott, the
Patients Defense Association spoke:
For too long, patient representation has
been a sham at the health center. One set
of so-called "community leaders" after ano-
ther have gained control, claiming the sup-
port of the community that they did not have.
Until now, patients have never organized for
the principle of true patient representation.
If patients are not organized, these small
groups of "leaders" can continue to get in
power and refuse to listen to us. We are
trying to do something that we haven't seen
done before: get patient representatives who
are accountable to a democratic organization
of hundreds of patients (Patients Defense
Association, 1979).
Whether true patient representation can actually
be achieved in the case of MNHC remains to be seen.
The counterinsurgent pressure from HEW is strong and
must be resisted every day. What counts is whether the
new board will consistently fight for the interests of
the patients and against the control imposed by HEW.
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